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Marie-Ann Bowden* Protecting Solar Access in
Canada: The Common Law
Approach
Fear No More, The Heat O' The Sun
Cymboline, IV, 11, 258
I. Introduction
The viability and adaptability of both active and passive solar
collectors as alternative energy sources is not to be doubted;
Canadian studies have deterrmined that a solar heated home is
feasible in locations south of 530NI and although the radiation
incident on each metre of land surface is relatively low in this
country2 the total amount of solar energy received in Canada is over
7,000 times the total energy consumed.3 Government sources
indicate that in spite of the relatively diffuse form of solar energy,
most Canadian locales are suitable for solar water, pool and space
heaters.4 As the technology develops to maximize effective collection
methods and costs for active systems decrease, the demand for solar
energy equipment will increase.
Traditionally, the North American housing market has required 30
years or more to accept significant innovation.' Undoubtedly,
government intervention, public interest, and uncertainties in
conventional energy costs and supply will accelerate this normally
long gestation period.6 Indeed, present indications are that by the
year 2000 renewable energy sources will meet up to ten per cent of
total energy demands 7 in Canada.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan. LL.B. Queen's, 1979;
LL.M. Osgoode Hall, 1981.
1. Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Office of Environmental
Conservation Catalogue of Solar Heating products and Services in Canada Research
Rep. No. 12. (Ottawa) February, 1977, p. 5 (hereinafter referred to as No. 12).
2. Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Renewable Energy Resource
Board, Implementing Solar Energy Technology in Canada, (Ottawa) 1977 p. 2.
3. No. 12, supra, note 1, p. 4 .
4. Ibid.
5. Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Sewell, W.R. Derrick,
Accelerating the Acceptance of Solar Heating, (Ottawa) 1979, p. IV (hereinafter
referred to as Sewell).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 25.
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The extent to which solar technology will be incorporated into
practical use relates not only to technical feasibility but to other
realities, including the law. To date the Canadian legal community
has failed to address the relevant questions which surround solar
energy. In so doing it is arguable that the acceptance and utilization
of this alternate energy source has been retarded. As the situation
now exists those who have invested in solar technology find
themselves at a disadvantage in that the commonlaw right to ensure
their "fuel" supply is veiled in uncertainty. As well, there is a marked
hesitancy in initiating any legislative response to the problem. In
practical terms, the problem is that the majority of the sun's rays
strike the earth's surface at an angle. An obstruction on a
neighbour's property may render the adjoining landowner's solar
collector unusable.' Even in the absence of existing obstructions there
is little incentive to install solar equipment if it may be rendered
ineffective sometime in the future. Some form of legal protection
must accrue to these consumers.
Traditional common law doctrines which address property rights
are based on principles of land-based wealth and the right of the
individual to use and enjoy his land as he sees fit. The Latin maxim
cusjus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum aptly summarizes this
prediliction. The uniqueness of an action to protect access to direct
sunlight further aggravates the confusion of the common law. To
date Canadian courts have steadfastly denied that the right to light
(let alone sunlight) is a property right appurtenant to ownership of
the fee; "no natural right exists to a single ray of light." 9 So too,
Canadian tort law has yet to specify interference with sunlight as an
actionable nuisance; the action having been confined to interference
with easements to light only.' 0
Insofar as legislation is concerned, the general concensus among
the provinces and larger municipalities is that the need for statutory
protection of solar access has not yet been significantly
demonstrated." Thus the pioneers of solar energy utilization find
8. Jesse L. Matuson, A Legislative Approach to Solar Access: Transferable
Development Rights (1977/78), 13 New England Law Review 835 at 838.
9. Gale, Gale on Easements, 12th ed. p. 6.
10. Ibid., see infra p. for possible new directions in this regard.
11. A conclusion based on data collected by the author from 23 Canadian
municipal and legislative counsel. In all fairness the majority of sources canvassed
have expressed a continuing interest in the possibility of solar related law in the
future.
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themselves presented with a "chicken and egg" dilemma; the
demand for statutory protection must exist to precipitate legislation
yet in order to preserve the viability of the technology access to
supply must be secure. Which comes first, protection of solar access
to facilitate and promote its use or extensive use of solar technology
which will justify legal protection?
In spite of present shortcomings it is arguable that new directions
in the recognition of solar access rights may be forthcoming. It is the
purpose of this paper to examine and assess common law solutions to
the problem of protecting solar access within the Canadian urban
context with particular emphasis on the more viable approaches.
II. The Doctrine ofAncient Lights
Prior to the mass introduction of electricity in urban residences the
necessity of access to natural light resulted in the common law
doctrine of ancient lights. The doctrine did not stem from the
recognition of any proprietary right to light as such, but was based on
the acquisition of a negative prescriptive easement; originally, if a
landowner (or occupier) could establish that windows overlooking
his neighbours property had been in existence "for longer than could
be remembered,"' 2 it was within that landowner's right to prevent
the erection of any structure on his neighbours land which would
interfere with sufficient light entering the window.
The ancient lights doctrine was introduced to North America by
our common law forefathers. However, the application of the
doctrine has since been substantially limited if not eliminated from
the common law.. Early Canadian cases such as Carter v. Grasett, 3
Simpson v. Eaton'4 and Reutsch v. Spry'5 which discuss the
acquisition and extent of a negative easement to light are based on
the premise that a right to acquire an easement by prescription exists.
Unfortunately, in all provinces but Newfoundland and P.E.I.,
statutes now specifically set out that no right to the use of, or access
12. The prescriptive standard of "longer than could be remembered" was
legislatively altered to a readily determinable number of years. For a complete
discussion of the doctrine and ancient lights within the historical context see Pfeiffer,
S.D., Ancient Lights: Legal Protection of Access to Solar Energy (1982), 68
American Bar Association Journal 288.
13. (1887), 140.A.R. 685.
14. (1907), 150.L.R. 161.
15. (1907), 140.L.R. 233.
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to, light may be acquired by prescription.' 6 For all intents and
purploses then, barring statutory change the doctrine is obsolete in all
but two Canadian jurisdictions. To change the legislation in order to
revive the doctrine is not foreseeable (nor practicable) as a means of
protecting solar access for two reasons: firstly, the ancient lights
doctrine has traditionally dealt with a right to light which does noit
necessarily imply a right to direct sunlight. The case of Coils v. Home
and Colonial Stores7 addresses the quantum of light which the
dominant landholder may claim; in order to maintain an action for
nuisance there must be
a substantial privation of light, sufficient to render the occupation
of the house uncomfortable, and to prevent the plaintiff from
carrying on his accustomed business on the premises as beneficially
as he had formerly done. '
8
Although it is arguable that the obstruction of direct sunlight
(necessary for heat production when using a solar collector) would
directly affect the habitability of a Canadian home, this presupposes
the right to light extends not only to the benefits of natural
illumination but to other properties of light including heat. This
premise is questionable, although two recent English decisions may
be of value in indicating possible directions.
Lord Denning's judgment in Ough v. King'9 reiterated the Colls
standard that the diminuation of light must be of a degree wherein
occupation of the home becomes uncomfortable according to the
16. See ["British Columbia, Land Registry Act, R.S.B.C. 1970, c.s. 38A; Alberta,
Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 177, s. 49; Saskatchewan, Land Titles
Act, R.S.S. 1953, c. 108, s. 69; Manitoba, Law of Property Act, R.S.M. 1970, c.
190, s. 28; Ontario, Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 246, s. 33; New Brunswick,
Easements Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 67, s. 8;.Nova Scotia, Statute of Limitations,
R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 168, s. 32(2); Northwest Territories, Limitation of Actions Act,
R.O.N.W.T. 1956, c. 59, s. 48. In Nova Scotia it is only the right to acquire such
easements in any city or unincorporated town which has been abolished. Prescriptive
easements to light or air which had been acquired in British Columbia, Manitoba,
Ontario, New Brunswick and in the cities and unincorporated towns of Nova Scotia,
prior to a certain date were not invalidated. The only prohibition in these provinces
was the right to acquire such easements by prescription in the future. Thus
prescriptive rights to the access and use of light and air acquired prior to the
following dates in the following provinces are still valid: British Columbia March 12,
1906; Manitoba-July 7, 1883; Ontario-March 5, 1880; New Brunswick-April 10,
1875; Nova Scotia-April 15, 1953 (for cities and unincorporated towns)."] from
Perspectives, infra, note 91.
17. [1904] A.C. 179.
18. Ibid., p. 187.
19. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1547 (C.A.).
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ordinary notions of mankind. He then continued in his review of the
lower court decision to say:
"First, I think the judge was entitled to have regard to the
locality... such as whether it is residential or industrial or the like.
Second, I think the judge was entitled to have regard to the higher
standards expected for comfort as the years go by.... In some
cases a higher standard may be reasonably required."20
The later case of Allen v. Greenwood2 addressed the question as it
related to sunlight on a greenhouse,
The plaintiff's answer all this simply by submitting that they are
entitled, by virtue of their prescription right to light, to all the
benefits of the light, including the rays of the sun. Warmth, they
say, is an inseparable product of daylight.... This reply
commends itself to me.
22
Goff, L.J. continues however,
I desire, however, to add one important safeguarding proviso to
this judgment. On other facts, particularly where one has solar
heating (although that may not arise for some years) it may be
possible and right to separate the heat, or some other property of
the sun, from its light, and in such a case a different result might
be reached.
23
It is arguable that in residential districts, where expectations for
natural illumination and quality of life are high, the demand for
direct sunlight is not unreasonable. As per Buckley, L.J. in
Greenwood, "[It] seems to me that in the case of a dwelling house it
might well be argued (I do not say with what degree of success for
this must depend on expert evidence) that adequate light was
important not only for illumination but also for health and
hygiene." ' 24 So too, Lord Denning's comments regarding changing
needs and expectations for comfort and reasonableness of
expectation may justifiably take into account public policy
considerations including promotion of public welfare through
alternate energy technology.
The second major shortcoming of the ancient lights doctrine as it
relates to the protection of solar access is the acquisition of the right.
Even if an enforceable scientific standard of direct sunlight could be
20. Ibid., pp. 1552-3.
21. [1979] 1AII E.R. 819.
22. Ibid., p. 827.
23. Ibid., p. 828.
24. Ibid., p. 829.
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established and the prescriptive right to light re-established by
statute, pursuant to the doctrine the prescriptive period only starts
with the erecting of the collector. Thus, our solar collecting
landowner would remain vulnerable to the activities of his neighbour
until the right was established through time. Legislating a shorter
time period for acquisition of the right (for example, five years for
existing users, ten for new projects)25 would reduce anxiety perhaps,
but would not alleviate the problem.
In light of other available responses to the problem of protection of
solar access the revival of the doctrine of ancient lights is a less than
ideal solution. Nonetheless the doctrine is worthy of examination as
it does demonstrate that "the law can recognize and protect a natural
resource that supplies significant benefits to individuals." 26 The
recognition of sunlight as a resource would represent an extension of
the ancient lights doctrine but more importantly would mark a
fundamental change in our approach to solar access protection.
III. Common Law Nuisance
The tort of nuisance is defined as an unreasonable interference with
the ordinary use of enjoyment of land by the owner (or occupier).
Potentially then, if the erection and employment of a solar collector
is considered an acceptable use of one's land then interference with
that use by way of an obstruction on neighbouring properties may be
actionable. Unfortunately, to date Canadian courts have been
reluctant to accept this application of the nuisance doctrine. In the
case of Earl Putnam Organization Ltd. v. Macdonald7 the plaintiff
sought damages and a mandatory injunction to force the defendant
to remove a wall which interfered with the plaintiff's right to light
and quiet enjoyment of the property. The judgment of Lacourciere
J.A. drew upon Halsbury to establish no natural right to lateral light
existed,
The difference between the right to light and the right to freedom
from smell and noise is that the former has to be acquired as an
easement, in addition to the right of property, before it can be
enforced; the two latter are ab initio incident to the right of
property.28
25. For a discussion of this proposal see Sally McKee, Solar Access Rights, (1982),
23 Urban Law Journal 437 at 453 (hereinafter referred to as McKee).
26. Martha Freeman, Securing Solar Access in Maine (1980), 32 Maine Law
Review 439 at 440.
27. (1978), 21 O.R. 815 (C.A.).
28. Ibid., p. 818.
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On this basis, and in the absence of any express, implied or
prescriptive easement "the law [is] clear that a landowner may so
build on his land so as to prevent any light from reaching his
neighbour's window." 29 The result in Earl Putnam is consistent with
North American judicial opinion which regards utilization of land for
construction of new buildings a positive, reasonable effort in spite of
negative impacts to light on existing structures.3" By failing to accept
the right to light as a property right caselaw has held the owner
(occupier) of land is without legal basis for claiming a nuisance - if
no right exists how can an interference with that "right" be
sustained?
The major exception to this long-standing judicial refusal to
recognize obstruction of light as an actionable nuisance arises in the
case of spite fences:3  that is fences which are constructed solely for
the purpose of obstructing light and air. The justification for
protecting access to light and air in these situations is based on the
motive itself and on the fact that no useful purpose is served by the
obstruction.32 Unfortunately, the spite fence exception is an
American phenomena yet to be adopted in Canadian jurisprudence.
In spite of the historical predeliction against a proprietory right to
light the tort of nuisance may yet be a tenable means of protecting
access to sunlight.33 Granted, extension of the doctrine to include
protection of solar access would be an innovative step, however
recent trends in the field no longer necessitate a quantum leap to
achieve this end.
Recent decisions have maintained, "[t]he category of interests
covered by the tort of nuisance ought not to be and need not be
closed, [in my opinion], to new or changing developments associated
29. Ibid., p. 818.
30. For an articulation of the American position, see Fountainebleu Hotel v. Forty-
Five Twenty-Five Inc. (1959), 114 So. 2d. 357.
31. Franklin Gevurtz, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, (1977), 65
Cal. Law Review 94, at 99 (hereinafter referred to as Gevurtz).
32. Ibid., p. 101. See Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 419, 66 S.E. 439 (1909);
Hornsby v. Smith 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E. 2d 20 (1941); Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 38,
37 N.W. 838 (1888).
33. For an interesting discussion of the relation between tort and property law as
they relate to nuisance, see Philip Girard, An Expedition to the Frontiers of Nuisance
(1980), 25 McGillLaw Review 565.
34. Nor-Video Services Ltd. v. Ontario Hydro (1978), 4 C.C.L.T. 244 at 256 (Ont.
H.C.).
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from time to time with normal usage and enjoyment of land."34
However, in order to draw access to sunlight into the category of
protected interests it is essential to consider several factors.
First, the issue remains as to whether the interference with light is
an interest which should be accorded protection within the
parameters of nuisance; should receipt of sunlight be an element of
use and enjoyment of property? With all due respect, earlier decisions
which preclude the action because there is no legal basis for claiming
a right to light, fail to consider the fundamental goal of this
particular tort outlined in Sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callagan,35
A balance has to be maintained beween the right of the occupier
to do what he likes with his own, and the right of his neighbour
not to be interfered with. It is impossible to give any precise or
universal formula, but it may broadly be said that a useful test is
perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of
manking living in society, or more correctly in a particular
society.
3 6
The legal right which is the basis for action is not the right to light
as such but the right to the use and enjoyment of land defined in
terms of "plain, and sober and simple notions." '37 It is arguable that
the right should extent to light. To quote Franklin Gevurtz,
The denial of a right to light is merely a conclusion that the
interest in unobstructed light and air is not to be judicially
protected. But the interest in unobstructed sunlight is
indistinguishable from other interests that nuisance law protects.
The property holder's ownership of airspace over land cannot
justify the conclusion that others have no right in sunlight and air.
Ownership is qualified by nuisance law; it cannot preclude the
application of nuisance law.38
Canadian case law has lent some support to the application of the
Sedleigh-Denfield criteria in other fact situations; the doctrine has
been applied in cases of telephone harassment, 39 interference with
35. [1940]A.C. 880.
36. kid., p. 903.
37. Walter v. Selfe (1851), 4 De G. and Sm. 315, at 322 per ;Sir J.L. Knight Bruce
V-C.
38. Gevurtz, supra, note 31, p. 99.
39. Motherwell v.Motherwell, [1976] 6 W.W.R. 550 (C.A.).
40. Supra, note 34.
41. National Capital Commision v. Pugliese, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 104.
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reception of television signals,4° abstraction of ground water," and
newly constructed buildings increasing neighbouring roof snowload
minimums.4 2 In all four examples, the legal basis for action was the
legal right to use and enjoyment 43 of the occupier's land.44 In
determining that the plaintiff's right was substantially impugned the
activities of, and relations between, the neighbouring properties were
considered. The assessment it seems is two-fold; first, as already
mentioned, the use and enjoyment by the plaintiff must be within the
parameters of plain, sober and simple notions of ordinary use.
Related thereto, the law does not extend protection through nuisance
to hypersensitive individuals or industries; "it is against interferences
to what objectively can be considered ordinary uses of property or
enjoyments of life that protection is afforded."' 45 Second, as per
Hawbrand, J.A. (as he then was) in N.C.C. v. Pugliese
4
1
... it is not sufficient to ask whether an occupier has made
reasonable use of his own property. One must ask whether his
conduct is reasonable considering the fact that he has a
neighbour.... The taking of all reasonable care is not a defense to
an action for nuisance. If an operation cannot by the existence of
reasonable care be prevented from causing a nuisance, then it
cannot be lawfully undertaken, unless there is either statutory
authorization, or consent of those injured.
Considerations of locale and duration of the alleged tort must be
weighed in determining the unreasonableness of the defendant's
actions.
The question as to whether blocking direct sun rays on a solar
collector constitutes an interference with the comfort and
convenience of living according to the standards of the average
42. T.H. Critelli v. Lincoln Trust & Savings Co. et. aL 86 D.L.R. (3d) 724 (Ont.
H.C.); affirmed Ont. C.A. (1979), 28 O.R. (2d) 701n.
43. Some question was raised in Pugliese regarding English common law rights
relating to ground water; however, the S.C.C. "chose to dodge the issue". See John
McLaren, "Case Comment: A. G. Manitoba v. Campbell" (1984), 26 C.C.L.T. 326.
44. It is noteworthy that the extension of the doctrine has yet to include interference
with aesthetics; see Re Simpson and Ontario Hydro (1979), 17 C.E.L.R. 321 (Ont.
Div. Ct.); Muirhead v. Timber Brothers Sand and Gravel Ltd. (1977), 3 C.C.L.T. 1
(Ont. H.C.). This may constitute a mixed blessing in that a major argument against
the utilization of solar technology has been the unsightly appearance of the
collectors which allegedly mar residential aesthetics. Witness the City of Saskatoon
which is presently drafting a municipal by-law to ban erection of solar collectors on
front lawns.
45. Supra, note 34, p. 256.
46. (1978), 170.R. (2d) 129, at 153-4.
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man 47 must be viewed in light of the impact of the interference upon
health and physical comfort.48 Courts have also considered impact
on broader social concerns such as a healthy environment as well.
49
By way of example, the more liberal interpretations of actionable
nuisance have included interference with a "recreational amenity," 50
and "invasion of privacy." 51 Viewed within this context, the
interference with the successful utilization of a solar collector should
be actionable. Certainly all would agree that the Canadian
environment requires that structures install central heat in order to be
habitable year round. If that heating facility is impaired the impacts
upon physical comfort and health are, to say the least, readily
ascertainable. One need not deal with degrees of benefit which are
effected - interference with the operation of the solar collector will
for several months of the year, determine whether the householder
will use the premises at all.
Beyond the level of the individual, it is arguable that broader
social concerns for energy conservation, promotion of alternate
energy technologies would favour a finding for the plaintiff.
Accepting for the moment that ordinary use and enjoyment
includes functional central heating, the stumbling block remains as to
whether a solar collector is of a particularly delicate or sensitive
nature and therefore not actionable because of the "special use"
involved. Viewed from the defendants perspective - does the
activity of the plaintiff make a nuisance out of conduct or actions
which would otherwise be harmless?52
Following the leading case of Robinson v. Kilvert53 the scope of
sensitive uses have included outdoor amphitheatres extremely
susceptible to outside light sources,54 a marble works harmed by
airborne effluents from surrounding industries,55 and a telegraph
47. See Clerk and Lindsell, Clerk & Lundsell on Torts, 15th ed. para. 23-06.
48. See Stoakes v. Brydges, [1958] 32 AJ.L. 205.
49. See Bautur v. Naneff (1971), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. H.C.).
50. Supra, note 34, p. 256.
51. Supra, note 39, p. 565.
52. Supra, note 34, at p. 256. It is at this juncture that the consideration of the
plaintiff's motive may come into play that is, was the plaintiff's "harmless" action
motivated by spite? See Hollywood Silverfox Farm v. Emmett, ,,1936] 1 All E.R.
825.
53. (1889), 41 Ch. D. 88.
54. Amphitheatres Inc. v. PortlandMeadows, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
55. Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gas Co., 106 S.W. 594 (1908).
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office adversely affected by induced currents from neighbouring
electric cars. 6 The basis for the determination that no nuisance
existed in such circumstances was succinctly articulated by Lord
Robertson in Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town
Tramways Companies,57
If the apparatus of such concerns requires special protection
against the operations of their neighbours, that must be found in
legislation... A man cannot increase the liabilities of his
neighbour by applying his own property to special uses whether
for busines or pleasure.58
To find otherwise and protect the delicate use would, in
Flemming's opinion, permit the plaintiff to "unilaterally enlarge his
own rights at the expense of another's." 59
The use of a solar collector is arguably not a sensitive or delicate
use. In the Nor-Video case,6" Robins J. refuted the contention that
the plaintiff, who had used his property to erect a receiving tower for
television broadcase signals, was engaged in a sensitive use. Using the
hypothetical parallel of a group of individuals with television
antennae he concluded, "the residents were simply maintaining a
commonplace domestic facility and using their property, in terms of
modern society, in a normal, and by no means exceptional,
manner."'II So too, a solar collector, although not yet common place
and still innovative in nature, is not exceptional. As with Nor Video's
cable operations we are dealing with an activity which is federally
sanctioned (and indeed subsidized).62 Realities must be addressed in
determining what is "exceptional." In the United States, for
example,
Solar experts estimate that by the mid-1980's solar heating will
cost no more than oil or gas heating in most parts of the country.
Solar heating may already be less expensive than all-electric
56. Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Companies,
[1902] A.C. 381.
57. Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Companies,
;[1902] A.C. 381.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 393.
59. Flemming, Law of Torts, 6th ed., p. 389 (hereinafter referred to as Flemming).
60. Supra, note 34 contra, Bridlington Relay v. Yorkshire Electricity Board, [ 1965]
Ch. 436.
61. Ibid., p. 257.
62. See Sewell, supra, note 5.
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heating in many areas. As a result, 10% of all new buildings will
be equipped with solar heating by 1985; this figure could reach
50% by the year 2000!63
What may seem a non-conforming method of home heating may
become a highly utilized technology in the near future.
In this same vein, the social utility argument, often raised by the
American defendant in justifying the reasonableness of his conduct,
64
operates in favour of the plaintiff. As we are dealing with a private
action, the limits on the weight of this argument are obvious,
65
nonetheless the long-range benefit to the public at large in promoting
solar energy use is worthy of note. So too the link between solar
technology and a cleaner environment should not be discounted.
Gautier v. NanefJ 6 is illustrative of how judicial support now lends
itself to environmental protection in common law nuisance cases.
67
In commenting on Gautier, John McLaren has stated that the
decision is a
valuable precedent for the contention that the effect of the
defendant's operation on the environment is a legitimate
consideration in weighing the conflicting interests in an anti-
pollution suit.
68
Arguably the activity of the plaintiff in constructing and utilizing a
solar collector is reasonable and sober employment of his property in
accordance with notions of ordinary use, and serves the public at
large in promoting a cleaner environment and alternate energy
consumption.
Coupled with consideration of the plaintiffs of use of a solar
collector is the reasonableness of the defendant's activities,
[T]he law of torts does not attempt to impose liability or shift the
loss in every case where one person's conduct has some
detrimental effect on another. Liability is imposed only in
those cases where the harm or risk to one is greater than he
ought to be required to bear in the circumstances.69
Although obviously dependent on the particular circumstances
63. Gevurtzsupra, note 31,p. 108.
64. See Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 Atlantic 453 (1886).
65. See Flemming, supra, note 59, p. 390.
66. Supra, note 49.
67. See also McKie v. K.V.P. Co. Ltd., [ 1948] 3 D.L.R. 201 (Ont. H.C.).
68. J. McLaren, The Modern Law of Nuisance, Alberta Law for the 80's, vol. 3,
(Calgary: L.E.S.A.) 1980, p. 5 at 20.
69. Flemming, supra, note 59, p. 386.
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involved, a few general comments might be made regarding
reasonableness as it relates to solar energy use. In most cases the
blocking of sunlight reaching a solar collector would materially effect
the efficacy of the equipment and would thus constitute more than a
"trifling inconvenience." 7 Depending on the extent of the
interference damages might be awarded in lieu of injunction,
although this would seem to run counter to alternate energy
promotion.
In speaking of the United States experience Franklin Gevurtz has
noted,
Some courts apparently fear that recognition of a course of action
for obstruction of light and air will prevent any use of adjoining
land. This fear is groundless. Protection of reasonable access to
light and air will no more prevent all use of adjoining land then
did recognition of rights to percolating water, about which similar
fears were expressed. Since sunlight strikes at an angle, only
structures sufficiently tall and sufficiently close to adjacent
structures will cause an obstruction. If buildings are adequately
spaced, as is the case in many residential areas, no unreasonable
restraints will be placed on adjoining lots by permitting an action
for obstruction of light. 7'
Within the Canadian context, the case of T.H. Critelli Ltd. et al.
v. Lincoln Trust & Savings Co. et al. 72 addresses this same concern of
inequitably preventing an individual from using his property for fear
of precipitating a nuisance. The plaintiff, Critelli, constructed a two-
store building in conformity with the local zoning and the National
Building Code standards for roof snow load. Some years later the
defendant constructed a nine-storey building on the lot adjacent to
the plaintiff. The resulting lee created by the defendant's structure
caused a marked increase in the snow which accumulated on the
plaintiff's roof and the consequent snow-load requirement increased
to almost four times that needed at the time of construction. The
plaintiff sued in nuisance for the costs of guaranteeing roof strength
in light of the new demand.73 The decision of Grange J., addressed
the question of balancing property interests and reasonable use,
70. St. Helen's Smelting v. Tipping (1865), 4 B. & S. 608.
71. Gevurtz, supra, note 31, p. 111.
72. Supra, note 42.
73. It is noteworthy that no negligence was found in the construction of the plaintiff
building nor any failure to comply with statutory provisions.
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There is, in my view, in cases such as this, a good deal of legal
advantage in being there fIrst... The defendant Lincoln Trust
[unlike the plaintiff] knew before construction of the existence of
the plaintiff's building and that the planned construction would
inevitably cause damage. Surely it was encumbent upon Lincoln
Trust to take steps to prevent that damage.
74
The notion of first in time was also raised in Non-Video; in the
opinion of Robins J., the defendant Hydo was obliged at the time of
embarking upon its project to ascertain any perceptible risk to the
plaintiff's existing interests. Failing to do so "amount[ed] to conduct
unreasonable enough to complete the tort of nuisance.... The
defendant by the placement of its electrical installation comman-
deered, at least partially, the plaintiff's beneficial use of its
property. 75
Applying the Grange argument to the question of solar use is only
possible to a limited degree. In the situation wherein a solar collector
is established prior to construction on neighbouring lots development
by the defendant is not precluded, however some effort should be
made to respect that pre-existing use. Complimenting building height
and site location considerations would be the most obvious means of
protecting the plaintiff's use when some flexibility exists - say for
example in new residential or industrial areas. However, the limits on
the Critelli decision are obvious in an established or urban downtown
area where land values necessitate maximum usage of property. By
way of illustration, what of the hypothetical wherein a highrise
apartment is proposed directly south of a solar collector on a
considerably lower building? If constructed, the building will virtually
eradicate any benefits of the energy source.
It is at this juncture that a balancing of the utility against the harm
must be undertaken. It is unlikely in this situation that an injunction
would be given to prevent construction due to the locale76 and the
adequacy of the damage remedy.77
Quite appropriately, the defense of locale is applicable to the
question of solar use and nuisance. After all, to adapt Lord Justice
74. Supra, note 42, p. 728.
75. Supra, note 34, p. 259.
76. The limitations on downtown solar collecting in general have been the source of
discussion. See, G. Hayes, Solar Access Law (Environmental Law Institute:
Cambridge, Mass.) 1979.
77. Supra, note 42, p. 728.
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The singer's oft-quoted comment in Sturges v. Bridgman78 "... what
would be a nuisance in [Suburbia] would not necessarily be so in the
[Inner-City]." Unlike the traditional approach to locale, wherein the
character of the neighbour is determined by the type of trade or
manufacture engaged in, the common feature of locale when there
has been an interference with solar use would be the type of
structures in the area as it relates to land use. This assessment would
not preclude the atypical structure provided it could be site located in
such a manner as to prevent harm to the defendant. In juxtaposition
to our downtown urban locale,79 it is arguable then, that in a
developing residential area my neighbour8° should be enjoined from
constructing a home which radically differs from the community
norm to a height which will shade my solar collector.8 Considering
the locale the conduct is "unreasonable," in the circumstances.
In summary, it is arguable that the solar energy utilizer is engaged
in an acceptable, and indeed laudible, use of his property which when
interfered with negatively affects his use and enjoyment of that
property, perhaps to a degree of inhabitability. The defendant, for his
part, is liable if the interference is unreasonable in light of the locale.
Questions of social utility, sensitive use and the legal basis for the
action may be dealt with to the advantage of the plaintiff. On this
basis the nuisance is not only actionable - it may be successfully
maintained.
IV. Trespass
By definition the tort of trespass involves a direct (and in most cases,
intentional) physical interference with ones property rights;
82
including the right to exclusive possession of the airspace vertically
above the land. Over the past 70 years of air travel, the extent of
ownership of this airspace has been the subject of much debate83 and
in spite of the "cujus est solum ejus est utque ad coelum" maxim in
78. (1879), 11 Ch. D. 852.
79. See hypothetical, supra, p. 22.
80. Note: In this discussion possible statutory limitations such as municipal zoning
will not be addressed.
81. In residential community planning the viability of solar zoning - to anticipate
and facilitate solar use, is most obvious.
82. See Flemming, supra, note 59, p. 35.
83. For a discussion of the "ad coelum" maxim as it relates to air travel see A tlan tic
Aviation v. N.S. Light and Power (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 55 (N.S.S.C.), and J.
Richardson, Private Property Rights in Air Space at Common Law (1953), 31 Can.
Bar Rev. 117.
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Flemming's opinion, caselaw has "establish[ed] no wider proposition
than that the air above the surface is subject to dominion insofar as
the use of space is necessary for the proper enjoyment of the
surface." 84 Even if the "ad coelum" doctrine is narrowly construed,
the owner of solar collector who finds his equipment shaded by an
entry into the air space above his property should be able to maintain
an action in trespass.85 Thus, for example, a construction crane
intentionally swung over the defendant's property from adjacent land
would be a trespass.86
The limitation of a trespass action in protecting solar access is
obvious - there must be a direct entry into the landholder's airspace.
Therefore the blocking of angled rays as they transverse a
neighbour's land would not constitute trespass. At Canadian
latitudes "no sunlight ever falls from directly overhead and the
number of properties crossed by a ray of sunlight below height of
potential obstructions increases in winter, when the demand for solar
energy for space heating would be highest." 87 Thus in only the most
blatant of invasions will trespass afford solar access protection.
V. Express Easements
An express easement is a privately negotiated right, privilege or
benefit without profit which accrues to the owner of one parcel of
land, by reason of such ownership, to use the land of another for a
special purpose.88 In terms of solar access, theroetically the owner of
the solar collector might approach his neighbour and offer to
purchase an easement across the property so that the maximum
possible direct rays angled across the adjoining property will reach his
collector unobstructed. Should he agree, the owner of the servient
tenement and all subsequent title holders are thenceforth restricted in
the use to which they may make of the land.
Although outwardly a practical solution to solar access protection
the question remains as to whether Canadian courts would enforce
such an agreement beyond the two "contracting parties;" that is,
would an easement to ensure solar access be considered an
84. Flemming, supra, note 59, p. 42; see Bernstein v. Skyviews, [1978] Q.B. 79.
85. The space occupied by the "invader" is being used as a corridor for the light
necessary to properly enjoy the collector, is it not?
86. LewvestLtd. v. Scotia TowersLtd. (1981), 10 C.E.L.R. 139 (Nfld.,T. Div.).
87. Ministry of Energy, Perspectives on Access to Sunlight (Toronto), reprinted
1980, p. 7 (hereinafter referred to as Perspectives).
88. Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th ed.
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enforceable incorporeal hereditament? After examining the question
of easements in some detail, Cheshire & Burns have concluded,
"Whether or not a new right, complying with the accepted
requirements of an easement will be judicially recognized or not is
very difficult to forecast. "89 As Keppell v. Bailey9" established, not all
incidents to property will be enforced in rem.
There are certain known incidents to property and its enjoyment,
among others, certain burdens wherewith it may be affected, or
rights which may be created and enjoyed over it by parties other
than the owner.... But it must not therefore be supposed that
incidents of a novel kind can be devised and attached to property
at the fancy or caprice of any owner;... great detriment would
arise and caprice of rights, if parties were allowed to invent new
modes of holding and enjoying real property, and to impress upon
their land and tenements a peculiar character which should follow
them into all hands, however remote. 9'
To determine the probable judicial response to the question one
must briefly examine the issues which arise in considering the "nature
of the easement beast": first, to establish and maintain an easement
there must be a dominant and servient tenement held by different
capable persons. 92 As well, the easement must accommodate the
dominant tenement, that is, there must be "a direct nexus between
the enjoyment of the right and the user of the dominant tenement." 93
Both criteria are satisfied in the case of a solar easement. Of
necessity the solar easement must burden immediately surrounding
lands, as it is these properties over which the angled sunrays pass. The
dominant tenement is thereby assured that the solar energy received
will be maximized and in turn the collector will be used at peak
efficiency. Use and enjoyment of the property is consequently
enhanced, 94 and the value of the property is increased. 95
In determining whether the solar easement would be recognized by
the courts, the most important issue is whether the right conveyed is
89. Cheshire & Burns, Modern Law of Real Property, 13th ed., p. 496 (hereinafter
referred to as Cheshire & Bums).
90. (1834), 2 My.& K. 517.
91. Ibid., p. 535.
92. Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property, 4th ed. pp. 806-813 for a
complete discussion (hereinafter referred to as Megarry & Wade).
93. Cheshire & Bums, supra, note 94, p. 49 1.
94. In the more extreme cases without the easement any structure on the property
may otherwise be inhabitable.
95. According to Re Ellenborough Park, [1955] 3 All E.R. 667 (Ch. D.) the
increase to property value is a relevant, though not decisive, factor.
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capable of forming a grant. More specifically, the nature and bounds
of the right must be clear and well defined; 96 a common sense
requirement in terms of providing surety regarding the extent of the
interest to future owners who were not party to the original
agreement.
To date English caselaw has held that right to an unspoiled view
cannot be the subject of a grant 97 nor can an easement be created for
the general flow of air over property to propel a windmill. 98 By the
same token, an easement may be granted for a defined channel of air
such as a ventilation shaft for a cellar99 provided the parameters of
the right are well defined. Reminiscent of our doctrine of ancient
lights, a prescriptive easement has been upheld for the right to a
"flow of light to a particular window."'0 0 Such an easement
"satisfies the test of certainty, for not only does the light pass over the
servient tenement along a defined channel, but it can be interrupted
by an obstruction placed across its line of approach."l°'
Although an express solar easement goes one step further than the
general right to light, demanding a higher standard as to the quality
of light (i.e. direct rays), 02 this should not preclude its enforceability.
In spite of the hesitancy of the courts to embrace new easements, as
per Lord St. Leonard in Dyce v. Hay'°3 "[t]he category of servitudes
and easement must alter and expand with the changes that take place
in the circumstances of mankind." As discussed earlier the advent of
solar technology and the necessity of encouraging alternate energy
utilization as our traditional sources are depleted, constitutes a
significant change in society's "circumstances."
In response to the realities of creating a solar easement, the owner
of the dominant tenement should approach his neighbour with a
clear and explicit written proposal drafted in such a way that some of
the possible problems outlined may be circumvented. With respect to
the description of the nature and extent of the burden, one of the two
distinct approaches which have emerged in the United States should
96. Megary & Wade, supra, note 94, pp. 812-813.
97. William Aldreds Case (1610), 9 Co. Rep. 576. See also McBean v. Wyllie
(1902), 14Man.R. 135.
98. Webb v. Bird (1862), 13 C.B. (N.S.) 841.
99. Bass v. Gregory (1980), 25 Q.B.D. 481.
100. Cheshire & Burns, supra, note 94, p. 493. See Harris v. De Pinna (1886), 33
Ch. D. 238.
101. Ibid..
102. See ancient lights, infra, p. 279.
103. (1852), 1 MacQ. 305.
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be undertaken; the first articulates the easement in energy jargon,
defining the necessary solar envelope in mathematical terminology.
Although initially more expensive to establish due to the unavoidable
necessity of a survey, the easement is probably more secure due to its
very precision. In the alternative, a general easement may be drafted
which provides sunlight to the collector during daylight hours. This
latter approach is readily understood by the parties concerned and
subsequent landowners and is less costly to establish. 104 In either case,
a defined, easily ascertainable channel should be established, leading
to a specifically detailed collector. In this regard we are again
adapting the ancient lights doctrine to include reference to the focus
of the light. Pursuant to the doctrine, the easement traditionally
protected light falling upon a defined aperture, and did not protect
the general incidence of light onto the building.' 05 The surface of the
solar collector is in one sense like a window in that the sunlight enters
most collectors through glass and is trapped on a darker absorber
plate where it is converted into heat - a greenhouse effect.1
0 6
Further credence might be afforded the new easement if both the
envelope and the "aperture" were defined.
Furthermore, it should be clear to both parties that the light
reaching the collector is to be direct sunlight - thus ensuring an
understanding as to the extent of the right.
Two other stumbling blocks remain in the ensuring acceptability of
the solar easement; 107 first courts are loath to recognize easements
where the servient owner is under a positive obligation to spend
money or perform a service. For example, in Regis Property Co. Ltd.
v. Redman'0 8 a covenant by the servient tenant to supply hot water
and central heating involved a service being performed and was thus
not an easement. To ensure uninterrupted light, it may be
encumbant upon one of the parties to trim vegetation or remove
other natural obstructions from the easement, a positive delegation
which the legal draftsperson would wish to avoid. Rather than
impose a duty upon the owner of the servient tenement (and possibly
104. S.D. Pfeiffer, Ancient Lights: Legal Protection to Solar Energy, (1982), 68
A.B.A. Journal 288, p. 289 (hereinafter referred to as Pfeiffer).
105. Perspectives, supra, note 90, p. 4. The easement does not protect the same
aperture is materially altered either.
106. For a detailed explanation of solar technology, see David McDaniels, The Sun:
Our Future Energy Source (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1979).
107. See Cheshire & Burns, supra, note 94, pp. ;496-7.
108. [1956] 2Q.B. 612.
Protecting Solar Access in Canada 280
necessitate financial expenditure on his part) the owner of the
dominant tenement should undertake the role of groundskeeper.
Although an inconvenience, the burden is not insurmountable and
may offer a valuable negotiating point. Second, courts have been
reluctant to enforce negative easements. Lord Denning explained this
predeliction of the law in Phipps v. Pears,'09 a case wherin a negative
easement for protection from weather was claimed.
Seeing that it is a negative easement, it must be looked at with
caution, because the law has been very wary of creating new
negative easements. .. If such an easement were to be permitted, it
would unduly restrict your neighbour in his own enjoyment of his
own land. " 0
In reality, the express solar easement is most often a negative
easement, that is the servient tenant agrees not to obstruct light.
However, historically, easements to light and support have been
upheld in spite of their negativeness."' Certainly an easement to
sunlight should be of a similar genre and subject to the same
exception.
In the suburban context, be it a new or an established area, the
express easement is a viable means of solar access protection; the
private nature of the original agreement allows it to be tailored for
the needs and desires of individuals." 2 Nonetheless, it should be
noted that the express solar easement is a purely voluntary transfer of
property rights; thus if any (or all) of the adjoining landowners refuse
to co-operate, the benefits to the solar energy user may be greatly
impaired. As well, the viability of solar energy as an economical
alternative energy source may be defeated should the adjoining
landowner place too high a price on the envelope.
Despite the traditional hesitancy of the courts a carefully drafted
solar easement may well meet with judicial approval in Canada
today. In view of other utility easements which have been statutorily
imposed on landowners, the voluntary efforts of individuals to secure
a constant, renewable energy supply should not be objectionable in
terms of public policy. In the United States express solar easements
almost always have been upheld by the courts and according to many
109. [1964] 2 All E.R. 357.
110. Ibid., pp. 357-358.
111. Cheshire & Bums, supra, note 94, p. 497.
112. A Legal Review of Access to Sunlight in Sunny Alberta (Alberta, submitted to
Alberta Environmental Research Trust) 1981, p. iv (hereinafter referred to as Sunny
Alberta).
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authorities offer one of the more promising methods of protecting
solar access." 3
To compliment these individual initiatives some 15 of the United
States had by 1980 enacted statutes to provide recording and
granting requirements for enforceable solar easements. As a result,
government involvement is minimal, and providing the criteria are
satisfied, enforceability is guaranteed. "14
Government action of a similar nature is not foreseeable in
Canada; thus solar energy users must continue to rely on their own
initiative in securing solar easements.
VI. Restrictive Covenants
By definition, a restrictive covenant is an agreement by which a
landowner obliges himself and his successors in title not to do some
act relating to use of the land."' This covenant arises in three distinct
situations: (a) an individual dividing his property who wishes to
ensure the separated parcel will not be used in a contrary manner, (b)
adjoining landowners who are able to agree and incorporate a
restrictive covenant into their respective deeds, (c) in a general
development scheme by a real estate developer." 6
The two former situations have some limited application to
protection of solar access. In the case of an individual dividing his
property: provided the covenant is clearly drafted to limit the uses of
the servient land and the covenant is included in the purchaser's
deed, the benefit and burden will pass to the respective assignees
"subject, in the case of burden, to proof that the legal estate if
acquired, has been acquired with notice of the covenant."" 7 The
inclusion of such a covenant at the division of a property requires
either a high degree of forethought on the part of the dominant
owner (i.e. "I may wish to install a solar collector at some time"), or
the present existence of a collector which must be assured continued
access. In actual fact then, the number of instances wherein an
113. Pfeiffer, supra, note 1 13 , p. 28 9 .
114. Ibid..
115. Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th ed. In order for the agreement to be binding,
1. The covenant must touch and concern land of the covenantee;
2. The contracting parties must intend the benefit to run with the land;
3. There must be privity of estate between the contracting parties. See Cheshire &
Burns, supra, note 94, p. 571.
116. Sunny Alberta, supra, note 115, p. 9 .
117. H.D. Anger & J.D. Honsberger, Canadian Law of Real Property (Toronto:
Canada Law Book, 1959), p. 598 (hereinafter referred to as Anger & Honsberger).
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individual would be dividing land with solar protection in mind
would be limited. Nonetheless, for those within these parameters, the
restrictive covenant is most suited to this end.
The negotiating of a restrictive covenant between adjoining
landowners is limited by the same restrictions as an express easement;
the agreement is entirely voluntary, possibly expensive and no
expenditure should be required of the servient tenement. In the result
the owner of the solar collector finds himself in a less than enviable
bargaining position. However, there is no problem in registering such
a covenant nor any reluctance on the part of the courts to enforce
it,"I8 a decided advantage over the easement.
The building scheme is often used to maintain minimum standards
in planned residential areas. Pursuant to these schemes, homeowners
and their assignees purchase property within a defined area wherein
known obligations are imposed on owners throughout. By way of
example, in Mulligan. v. Country Club Heights Ltd. 119 the court
upheld a building scheme which prohibited design, construction or
siting of any building which would destroy or seriously impair the
view of another landowner. The exact terms incorporated in the deed
referred to setback and height restrictions and plan approval by the
grantor developer. 20 By virtue of the scheme each owner was both
burdened insofar as he could not violate his covenant, and benefited
as between himself and the various other purchasers.
In terms of protecting solar access the optimal utilization of
restrictive covenants would be enjoyed in "large new subdivisions
and those of moderate size surrounded by low-rise development."'1
21
In these communities, pursuant to a common building scheme,
guarantees could be provided to ensure direct access to sunlight by
articulating height, siting, and vegetation restrictions. Once
established, the common building scheme becomes enforceable as
between purchasers of lots within the scheme providing certain
prerequisites are established: (1) both parties derived title from a
common vendor, (2) prior to the defendant and plaintiff purchases
both lots were part of a building scheme imposed by the vendor and
118. For a more complete discussion of advantages and disadvantages see infra,
page 282 in reference to building schemes.
119. (1961), 27 D.L.R. (2d) 444 (N.B. S.C.).
120. Ibid., p. 446-7. For similar cases, see Powell v. Hennsley, [1909] 1 Ch. 680;
Goolen v. Anstee (1868), 18 L.T. 898.
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subject to restrictions consistent with the vendor's scheme, (3) the
restrictions were for the benefit of all lots intended to be sold or
retained by the vendor, (4) the purchasers of the lots were aware of
the restrictions and the intended benefits of the scheme and
purchased on that footing. 22 As noted in Mulligan restrictive
covenants to protect views have been upheld by the courts, as have
covenants dealing with vegetation, structural design, building and
site aesthetics.' 23 Height, setback and plan approval restrictions are
the common approach to defining these covenants and would also be
the method of ensuring solar access. Thus there would be a degree of
"familiarity" for both lay, legal and construction persons faced with
the solar covenant: a new use of an old tool. 1
24
The advantages to the building scheme accrue to all parties
involved in the development. If properly promoted, a solar
subdivision may prove a most remarkable commodity in certain
locations.
As recent studies have shown an "enormous public reservoir of
good will" towards solar energy, such covenants could well
become popular among developers. Indeed, some may find them
attractive as an inexpensive means of marketing a "solar
subdivision" without the economic risk of actually purchasing and
installing solar equipment. 1
25
In establishing these subdivision restrictions prior to construction,
two other positive repercussions follow: first, if incorporated into the
planning stage "[t]he scope of the solar right can be the best possible
in the circumstances."' 2 6 Second, the assured protection ab initio and
the community commitment encourages solar use as a "first choice"
rather than a retrofit. So too, on a wider scope, the acceptance and
utilization of solar technology in general is benefited by such
development schemes.
From the purchasers perspective, the restrictive covenant adds no
extra initial cost to his decision to incorporate solar heating into his
home. The covenant is a given, and vis d vis his neighbour there is no
need to negotiate to ensure continued access. On a similar note
should disagreements arise, restrictive covenants are directly
enforceable between land owners without government intervention.
122. Perspectives, supra, noe 90, p. 29.
123. Anger & Honsberger, supra, note 120, p. 599.
124. Perspectives, supra, note 90, p. 26.
125. Sunny Alberta, supra, note 115, p. 10.
126. Perspectives, supra, note 90, p. 30.
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By the same token, however, the expense and time commitment
incumbant in a self-help remedy is a decided disadvantage.
From the lawyer's perspective, although, the initial drafting of the
covenants itself should be done by specialists, once the technical
requirements are established, the clearly articulated building scheme
becomes a viable means of protecting solar access. The individual
covenants need not be identical; that is, they might vary throughout
the defined area, thus permitting a good degree of flexibility. It is
necessary to stress however, "[a] building scheme is not created by
the mere fact that the owner of an estate sells it in lots and takes
varying covenants from various purchasers. There must be notice to
the various purchasers of what I may venture to call the local law
imposed by the vendors on a defined area.' 1 27 It is encumbant upon
the solicitor to determine the existence and reciprocal nature of the
building scheme - that is either an express or implied obligation on
the part of the vendor to impose similar restrictions on other lots.1
28
In Re Campbell and Cowdy, 129 for example, the developer-vendor
had included a clause in the agreement of sale which outlined he was
"not bound to impose the same or any other restrictions on the lands
covered by the same plan.. .,130 as a result there was no obligation
on the developer to impose similar restrictions on other lots. "In fact
the form of agreement used [made] it clear that the company
expressly negatived any such obligation." 3' If the lands within, and
subject to, the building scheme are clearly defined, and the nature
and extent of the title burden on is clearly understood, then the
lawyer can assure his client of enforceability - a claim he would be
reluctant to make with an express easement.
It is somewhat of a paradox that advancement of solar law
through the employment of restrictive covenants, or more specifically
building schemes, has resulted in this land use control tool being
employed as a two-edged sword. Some States residential
developments have included restrictive covenants which bar
"appliances and installations" on dwelling roof tops if they are
127. Ibid., p. 27.
128. Reid v. Bickerstaff, [ 1909] 2 Ch. 305, at 319.
129. Anger & Honsberger, supra, note 120, p. 600.
129. [1928] 1 D.L.R. 1034 (Ont. S.C.).
130. Ibid., 1036.
131. Ibid., p. 1037.
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visible to neighbours.' 3 2 Home owners' associations have also used
covenants to require approval of exterior additions and with this
power have purposely blocked solar construction. 33
Ironically,' due to the high initial costs and innovative nature of
the technology, commercialization of solar energy has been aimed at
high income consumers willing to venture into new technologies.
Unfortunately, it is these same consumers who are commonly
restrained by such covenants in planned developments where a
cohesive look is a priority.' 35 In response one state, California, has
declared "anti-solar" covenants against public policy' 36 and enacted
legislation declaring any covenant which "effectively prohibits or
restricts the installation or use of a solar energy system
unenforceable.""'7
The Canadian position remains very much open to debate,
primarily because of the rarity of any attempt to covenant either "for
or against" solar collectors. Certainly the Canadian attitude toward
solar energy has been positive and thus those developers in viable
locations who wish to attempt a solar subdivision should be
encouraged. Once again, we are faced with the chicken and egg
dilemma in that "lack of awareness and apprehension still plague
most developers and builders, many of whom are still waiting for
more demonstrated acceptance by home buyers." ''  Yet how will
acceptance be demonstrated but through the development and sale of
solar communities?
VII. Conclusion
Although tort law has laid the foundation for an action in nuisance if
there is interference with solar access, the probable success of a court
action is not clear. Arguably, the present trend of the courts is to
expand the purview of nuisance to respond to changing societal
needs, and certainly this offers a forum more conducive to solar
access protection. In spite of public policy considerations, however,
132. John Wiley, Solar Energy and Restrictive Covenants: The Conflict between
Public Policy and Private Zoning (1979), 67 Cal. Law Rev. 350 at 352 (hereinafter
referred to as Wiley).
133. Ibid..
134. Wiley, supra, note 135, p. 353.
135. Ibid..
136. For a case on point see Kaye v. Old Orchard Association (1979), 1 Solar Law
Reports ;503, as discussed in Pfeiffer, supra, note 112.
137. California Civil Code, ss. 714 (West Supp. 1979).
138. Sunny Alberta, supra, note 115, p. 11.
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the legal argument to maintain such an action must be soundly
based. Application of relevant caselaw should establish the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's use of the property and the direct
relationship between the defendant's actions and interference with
ordinary use and enjoyment of the property. Faced with tipping the
balance between the "maxims cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum
et ad infernos" and "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas," the
plaintiff must admit the practical limitations of locale and utility of
the competing conduct on solar use. In the ideal scenario (a
residential, pre-existing collector situation for example') wherein
access is essential to ensure habitability of the residence the defendant
may argue nuisance with some success by drawing in historical
doctrines and adapting recent jurisprudential parallels.
Nonetheless, a tort action should not be the primary means of
protecting solar access. An individual solar user should attempt to
negotiate a solar easement with his neighbour to secure the long-term
viability of his home heating alternative. Once again the
enforceability of such an easement demands a liberal attitude in the
courts, however, if the easement is carefully drafted to meet the
technical requirements of this tool, if the acceptability of solar
easements in other jurisdictions can be outlined, and the perceived
social need highlighted, the hesitancy of the courts to accept new
easements should be overcome.
The restrictive covenant is in many respects the most judicially
acceptable means of protecting solar access. If privately negotiated in
accordance with legal requirements, individual land owners may
register the covenant and can anticipate few problems in enforcing
the agreement. The building scheme is also viable and possibly a
positive marketing strategy in new residential communities.
In the final assessment none of the common law responses offer a
panacea to the solar access problem. The individually negotiated
property-based responses are purely voluntary and potentially
expensive to acquire. Building schemes face a reluctant construction
community and the legal barriers in enforcing express easements,
although not insurmountable, may well discourage many alternate
energy users. The tort response on the other hand is tainted with
some uncertainty and is potentially expensive.
It is unfortunate that solar energy users may well be forced to take
the legal initiative to protect their interests. If the state actively
promotes the employment of alternate energy sources it should
protect, or at a minimum advise, the individuals who pioneer such
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policy. Although precedent exists for protecting solar access
statutorily139 there has been no direct federal or provincial legislative
response to the need. 4 Any action must be premised on a perceived
societal need or desire. Realistically, one cannot foresee the advent of
such regulation until the promotion of alternate energy becomes a
political priority in Canada. In the meantime, solar pioneers must
rely on the common law alternatives and fend for themselves while
society as a whole gains from their efforts.
139. Possible legislation responses including statutory easements, zoning, transfers
of air space etc., however, these solutions are beyond the scope of this paper. See
Matuson, supra, note 8; McKee, supra, note 25; Pfeiffer supra, note 112.
140. An attempt to establish a right to sunlight has been twice introduced in Alberta
as a private member's bill but on both occasions died on the order paper. See Alta.
Bill 228, (1980).
